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Understanding bricolage in norm development: 
South Africa, the International Criminal Court, and the 
contested politics of transitional justice  
 
Alexander Beresford and Daniel Wand 
 
Abstract 
Within international relations the normative agency of African actors is often downplayed or 
derided. This article develops the concept of bricolage to offer a novel understanding of norm 
development and contestation in international relations, including the role African actors play 
in this. We contend that a QRUP¶VFRUHK\SRWKHVLVFDQEHWKRXJKWRIDVWKHQXFOHXVRIDQRUP
In the case of complex international norms, if this core hypothesis is sufficiently vague and 
malleable, the norm will continue to attract a range of actors who may claim to share a 
commitment to enacting the core hypothesis even if they simultaneously promote a variety of 
potentially conflicting and contradictory meanings-in-use of the norm when doing so. Each 
meaning-in-use, we argue, might be thought of as a product of bricolage: a process of 
combining and adapting both new and second-hand materials, knowledges, values and 
practices by an actor to address a problem in hand. Through a detailed study of the 
contestation of transitional justice between South Africa and the International Criminal Court, 
we elucidate how bricolage can help to illuminate the normative agency of African actors in 
shaping transitional justice. Processes of bricolage add complexity and potentially confusion 
WRDQRUP¶VGHYHORSPHQWEXWEULFRODJHDOVRRIIHUVWKHSRWHntial for a creative and dynamic 
means by which a range of actors can inject pluralism, dexterity and vitality into debates 
DERXWDQRUP¶VPHDQLQJDQGRSHUDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ 
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Introduction 
Transitional justice is concerned with facilitating or consolidating a new democratic order 
after mass violence and/or authoritarian rule and is founded on the  ‘basic idea ? that  ‘societies 
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need to be seen to confront and deal with unjust histories if they are to achieve a qualitative 
break between the past, present and future ?.1 Central to transitional justice are questions 
about how those responsible for human rights violations should be held to account and what 
role (if any) they should play in the new government and society. This, in turn, raises 
normative questions about what precisely constitutes  ‘justice ? for victims of mass violence, 
and who should take responsibility for its definition and execution. 
 
Two actors, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the African National Congress (ANC) 
government of South Africa, are currently embroiled at the centre of this contentious politics. 
In this article we trace how the ICC ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐ ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĂů ũƵƐƚŝĐĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
contested, contributing to what is widely argued to be a legitimacy crisis experienced by the 
Court, particularly in Africa.2 This crisis is characterised by a lack of enforcement by states of 
ICC arrest warrants, its difficulties prosecuting high profile cases effectively, and the threat of 
some African states to leave the Court entirely, including South Africa, which had previously 
been one of its leading supporters. 
 
Engaging with, and building upon, theories of norm development and contestation in 
International Relations theory, we argue, enables us to understand the latest manifestation 
of these tensions. As constructivist scholars have noted Ă ŶŽƌŵ ?Ɛ  ‘meaning-in-use ? is 
constantly subject to contestation and reshaping.3 In this respect, as Krook and True have 
argued,  ‘norms that spread across the international system tend to be vague, enabling their 
content to be filled in many ways and thereby appropriated for a variety of different purposes ? 
such that we should see  ‘norms as  “processes ? ? as works-in-progress, rather than as finished 
products ?.4 In this case, we contend that a  ‘core hypothesis ?5 of the transitional justice norm 
(TJN) can be identified: that perpetrators of mass violence must be held accountable for their 
crimes as part of a wider political project of enabling states to transition from periods of mass 
 
1 Gabrielle Lynch, Performances of Justice: The Politics of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), p. 7 
2 Phil Clark, Distant Justice: The Impact of the International Criminal Court on African Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2018) 
3 ǡǮ-in-use: Qualitative Research on Norms and International Relationsǯǡ Review of International 
Studies, 35:1 (2009), pp. 175-193. 
4 Mona Lena Krook and Jackie True, Ǯorms: The United Nations and the Global 
Promotion of Gender Equalityǯǡ European Journal of International Relations 18:1 (2012), p. 104. 
5 ǮǯǤǮǫ
Constructivist Ethics and the Responsibility to Protectǯǡ International Organization 72:1 (2018), pp. 173-203. 
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violence and/or authoritarianism to new political orders wherein human rights would be both 
safeguarded and advanced. What has enabled this norm to  ‘travel ? successfully in the 
international system is its ambiguity and its ability to simultaneously accommodate a wide 
range of (often competing) meanings-in-use promoted by a wide range of actors all claiming 
ƚŽƐŚĂƌĞĂĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƌŵ ?ƐĐŽƌĞŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?As such, as Carla Winston notes, the 
TJN now entails a complex  ‘cluster ? of the following contested elements:  ‘problems ? that it 
seeks to address (grave human rights violations, civil conflict, authoritarianism, etc.);  ‘values ? 
that help to identify the ends the actor wishes to pursue (e.g. anti-impunity, reconciliation, 
peace, accountability, rule of law); and  ‘behaviours ?, in terms of the action taken to address 
the problem (e.g. amnesty, truth commissions, trials, reparations).6 We contend, therefore, 
that while a range of actors thus still find their own normative commitments compatible with 
ƚŚĞ d:E ?Ɛ ĐŽƌĞ ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? ƚŚĞ ŶŽƌŵ ?s competing meanings-in-use render the subsidiary 
questions regarding what actually constitutes justice and accountability unresolved, and at 
the centre of political struggles. 
 
The main contribution we make in this article is to develop a fresh understanding of how 
norms can come to be filled with competing (and often contradictory) meanings-in-use while 
their core hypothesis can retain a degree of autonomy and integrity that prevents it from 
collapsing entirely. We contend that a ŶŽƌŵ ?Ɛ ĐŽƌĞ ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ŽĨ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ
nucleus of a norm, which attracts and draws together a range of actors who share a 
commitment to enacting this core hypothesis. This allows us to understand how, if this core 
hypothesis remains sufficiently vague, it will continue to  ‘travel ? in the way Krook and True 
identify. This is because a variety of meanings-in-use attached to the norm orbit around the 
core hypothesis, each composed of unique combinations of the  ‘problems ? they seek to 
address and the  ‘values ? and  ‘behaviours ? principled actors apply to remedy the problems. 
This enables us to understand a situation  ‘where variation and stability coexist, and where 
intersubjective meaning is at once generally set and specifically fluid ?7: in short, it moves us 
beyond an understanding of a norm having a singular accepted meaning that is taken or 
resisted by a bifurcated international society composed of norm-promoters and norm-
 
6 ǡǮǡǡǣǡ European Journal of International Relations, 
24:3 (2018), p. 16. 
7  Winston (2018), p. 654. 
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resistors, and instead illuminates the way a range of actors can claim a principled commitment 
ƚŽĂŶŽƌŵ ?ƐĐŽƌĞŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐǁŚŝůĞƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨǀĂůƵĞs and behaviours 
that potentially contradict and conflict with those of other actors. 
 
We develop the concept of bricolage to understand how this kind of complex norm with 
multiple meanings-in-use might develop. Emerging from Anthropology, and in particular from 
the work of Lévi-Strauss, bricolage refers to a process by which the agent (the bricoleur) sets 
about solving a problem or competing a task by  ‘making do ? with the resources available to 
them in a given moment.8 This potentially involves combining a range of both new and 
second-hand materials, knowledges and practices that have been tweaked, refashioned, 
adapted, or transformed entirely and combined together such that they are collectively 
repurposed to tackle the problem in hand.9 In short, a bricolage aims to become more than 
the sum of its parts through its  ‘patchwork of the new and second hand ?.10 
 
But how might bricolage be useful for understanding norm development in international 
relations? In terms of how a norm develops, we contend that this should be examined at 
particular moments of norm contestation, and through detailed empirical analysis of the 
epistemological development of each actor involved, in order to understand how they 
develop their meanings-in-use of a particular norm and why and how this contributes to 
ĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƵŝůĚŝŶŐŽŶtŝŶƐƚŽŶ ?ƐĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐĂƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ŽƌĐůƵƐƚĞƌŽĨ
problems) present themselves to interested actors (e.g. in this case human rights abuses, 
authoritarianism, war), each actor will then seek to identify the values/ends that they wish to 
achieve (e.g. in this case peace, reconciliation, an end of impunity etc.) and the behaviours to 
deploy to meet these ends. An actor might employ a bricolage approach to the particular 
problem by drawing upon a trove of the values and behaviours available to them which will 
be tweaked, refashioned, adapted, or transformed entirely and combined together such that 
they are collectively repurposed to tackle the problem in hand. In this case, depending on the 
 
8 Claude Lévi-ǮThe Nature of Human Society: The Savage Mindǯǡ (London, Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1966), pp. 16-36 
9 In some Business Studies scholarship Ǯbricolageǯ is a celebrated strategy of small and resourceful entrepreneurs. See: Ted Baker 
and Reed E. Nelson ǮConstructing Something from Nothing: Resource Construction through Entrepreneurial Bricolageǯ 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 50:3 (2005), pp. 329-366. This concept has also been used by geographers to discuss how 
development interventions might be more successful when they are culturally grounded. See: 	ǡǮ
Institutions: Bricolage and the Social Embeddedness of Natural Resource Management. The European Journal of Development 
Research, 14:2 (2002), pp. 11-30.  
10 Frances Cleaver, F., & Jessica de Koning, Furthering critical institutionalism. International Journal of the Commons, 9:1 (2015).  
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problem(s) facing them, this might require some combination of criminal trials, amnesties, 
truth commissions, lustration, etc. to fulfil the core hypothesis of the TJN as each actor sees 
fit. This, we argue, helps to understand the development of diverse and potentially 
contradictory meanings-in-use of a norm by a variety of actors who all, nonetheless, claim to 
ƐŚĂƌĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƌŵ ?ƐĐŽƌĞŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? 
 
Bricolage, we argue, adds new understandings to Amitav AĐŚĂƌǇĂ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞĂƐ ŽĨ  ‘norm 
localization ? which:  ‘Instead of just assessing the existential fit between domestic and outside 
identity norms and institutions, and explaining strictly dichotomous outcomes of acceptance 
ŽƌƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? describes a complex process and outcome ? ?11 It is this complex process that we 
draw attention to. However, bricolage, we argue, differs from AĐŚĂƌǇĂ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌŽůĞ
 ‘local ? actors play as  ‘norm-takers ďƵŝůĚ ?ŝŶŐ ?ĐŽŶŐƌƵĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚƌĂŶƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŶŽƌŵƐ ?ĂŶĚ
local beliefs and practices ?,12 and also the related concept of norm  ‘vernacularization ?, in 
which local actors  ‘take the ideas and practices of one group and present them in terms that 
another group will accept ?.13 While helpful to understanding situations where actors might 
play a role in building congruence between local and global norms, these approaches 
nonetheless assume an asymmetrical relationship in which local actors  ‘take ? externally 
derived norms and smooth off their rough edges to render them palatable and 
operationalizable.14 Bricolage allows us to comprehend a more creative and potentially 
offensive strategy in which an array of actors traverse  ‘local ? and  ‘global ? sites of norm 
development to assemble complex, idiosyncratic combinations of values and behaviours to 
create new (or modified) meanings-in-use which, to return to Antje Wiener, might be 
identified as  ‘specific meanings that are influential at a specific time and place, yet will only 
be revealed through individual use. ?15 The meanings-in-use created through bricolage may 
thus offer  ‘transient artefacts ?16 in some cases. That is, they are always contingent and time 
 
11 Amitav Acharya ǮHow Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalismǯǡ
International Organization 58:2 (2004), p. 241, emphasis added. 
12 Acharya (2004), p.241, emphasis added. 
13 Peggy Levitt and Sally Merry Ǯ on the Ground: Local Uses of Global Women's Rights in Peru, China, India and the 
United StatesǯǡGlobal Networks, 9:4 (2009), p. 446, emphasis added. 
14 This is where we differ from the application of bricolage by geographer Frances Cleaver who was studying local resource 
management in Zimbabwe and how local communities adapted to external development interventions. ǯs 
with the effectiveness of bureaucratic institutions and norms in a local cultural context. For Cleaver, bricolage was effectively a 
process of norm localization in which Ǯthe use and adaptation of pre-existing [local] customs and practices confer new arrangements 
witǮǯǯ. See Cleaver (2002), p. 14. 
15 Wiener (2009), p. 180. 
16 A phrase used by engineer scholar G.F. Lanzara, ǮBetween Transient Constructs and Persistent Structures: Designing Systems in 
Action.ǯ The Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 8:4 (1999), pp. 331-349. 
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bound  ‘solutions ? to the idiosyncratic problems they confront. They may, like all forms of 
bricolage, be sometimes thought of as  ‘second-best solutions ? making-do in a meandering 
fashion with the compromised materials available to hand.17 In the case of norms, this might 
provoke some actors to bemoan what they perceive to be the generation of an ever-
increasing myriad of next-ďĞƐƚ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ŽďĨƵƐĐĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƌŵ ?Ɛ ĐŽƌĞ
hypothesis and/or allow some actors to subvert it.18 Alternatively, bricolage could be 
recognised as providing a dynamic palette of values and behaviours to apply to 
heterogeneous problems. This latter ĨŽůůŽǁƐ Ă  ‘pragŵĂƚŝĐ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚǀŝƐƚ ? ethic which, 
according to Jason Ralph, guards  ‘useful norms ? against over-zealous norm entrepreneurs 
who  ‘too readily take the meaning of a norm to be fixed and this uncritically authorizes self-
appointed norm entrepreneurs to dismiss alterative prescriptions as shameful acts of 
noncompliance ?.19  
 
We develop this argument through a case study of the fallout between the ICC and the ANC 
government of South Africa. First, ǁĞƚƌĂĐĞƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ/ ?ƐƌĞƚƌŝďƵƚŝǀĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ-
in-use of the TJN, which advocates that transitional justice should follow a retributive model 
of justice in which perpetrators are subject to prosecution and punitive sentencing according 
to an  ‘apolitical ? application of international law. This follows a deterrent logic: that potential 
perpetrators of mass violence will be deterred from committing such acts if they can expect 
with a reasonable degree of certainty that their acts will be prosecuted and punished. Rather 
than employing a dynamic bricolage combining lots of diverse elements to each  ‘problem ? it 
confronts ? ƚŚĞ / ?Ɛ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ-in-use of the TJN is, despite the institutions pluralist origins, 
restricted by its own statute to focus on challenging the problem of impunity for human rights 
violators through the application of international criminal trials. A critical issue is that the 
Court attempts to ascribe the core hypothesis of the TJN with a fixed notion of what constitute 
appropriate values and behaviours when it comes to tackling the impunity of human rights 
abusers: the pursuit of retributive criminal justice. Privileging this focus and approach above 
alternatives is argued to ĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ and is inscribed into its statute, limiting its 
room for manoeuvre.  
 
17 Baker and Reed (2005) p. 334. 
18 Aidaǯecent work details how norms subject to heavy contestation and/or co-optation can ǮǯǤ
Aidan Hehir, Hollow Norms and the Responsibility to Protect (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).  
19 Ralph (2018), p.175. 
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Other actors, however (particularly those emerging from periods of mass violence and 
authoritarianism), ĂƌĞĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĐŽŵƉůĞǆĐŽŶƐƚĞůůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ  ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŵĂǇ
have to deal with when enacting the TJN, which in turn might lead them to privilege a variety 
of alternative values and behaviours beyond the pursuit of retributive criminal justice alone. 
To develop this argument we take the case of South Africa. Drawing on analysis of an 
extensive range of internal party discussion documents, government pronouncements, press 
statements, policy documents and speeches, we trace the evolution of the normative 
approach to transitional justice ŽĨ ^ŽƵƚŚ ĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ƌƵůŝŶŐ ƉĂƌƚǇ ? ƚŚĞ ANC, which 
emerged as the figurehead of the liberation struggle against apartheid and has subsequently 
been returned to power since the first elections in 1994 through successive landslide election 
victories. The ANC shifted from advocating Nuremberg-style prosecutions for perpetrators of 
apartheid in the late 1980s as negotiations with the apartheid regime began. Drawing on 
experiences from South America, the ANC began developing an alternative meaning-in-use of 
the TJN characterised by a commitment to a dynamic bricolage approach to transitional 
justice employing a palette of reparative, restorative and retributive mechanisms of achieving 
accountability  W however imperfect  W as part of a wider effort to secure a lasting political 
settlement.  
 
This bricolage approach has subsequently been deployed by the ANC in its approach to 
transitional justice beyond its borders. Understanding the dynamics of bricolage in norm 
development helps us to understand the current fallout with between the ANC and the ICC: 
while the ANC views retributive criminal justice (and the ICC as an institution) as adding value 
to the deployment of transitional justice, it sees this as an auxiliary to a more flexible bricolage 
approach combining the experiences, values and behaviours of a range of actors to meet the 
ŶĞĞĚƐŽĨĞĂĐŚĐŽŶƐƚĞůůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?ƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞE ?ƐďƌŝĐŽůĂŐĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝƐĂŶ
attempt to reframe the TJN by embracing what it sees as a more pragmatic approach to norm 
entrepreneurship where we focus not on ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŶŽƌŵ ?Ɛ  ‘core hypothesis but the 
tenacity of those who insisted [its] prescription was fixed, as well as those who held an 
unyielding commitment to ends that were, in practice, unrealistic ?.20  
 
20 Ralph (2018), p.176 
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More broadly, the concept of bricolage provides fresh understandings of complex African 
agency in norm entrepreneurship and reflects wider efforts to address the under-
representation of African perspectives in International Relations scholarship.21 As Rita 
Abrahamsen rightly argues,  ‘Contrary to common assumptions that the liberal world order 
was  “made in the West ? ?it was produced in interaction with Pan-African ideology and 
actors. ?22 In this article we highlight the normative agency of African powers in designing, 
shaping and contesting international liberal norms.  
 
The ICC ?ƐRetributive Meaning-in-Use of the TJN: Cosmopolitanism and Contestation 
 
The retributive meaning-in-use of the TJN has been promoted and consolidated since the 
beginning of the latter part of the 20th century including through the establishment of the 
Nuremberg and Far East Tribunals and then, more recently, the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), as well as numerous other 
international and hybrid tribunals, which are focused on prosecuting individuals for alleged 
crimes. It should also be recognised that national courts are increasingly taking on the role of 
prosecuting international crimes. This result of this process of promotion and consolidation is 
encapsulated in the ICTY ?Ɛ bold epistemological claim that it  ‘laid the foundations for what is 
now the accepted norm for conflict resolution and post-conflict development across the 
globe ?.23 In support of this view, Geoffrey Robertson QC, a leading international lawyer, said 
that he first case before the ICTY was  ‘a deeply symbolic moment: the first sign of a seismic 
 
21 For discussion see Sophie Harman and William Brown, Ǯǫlace of Africa in International ǯǡ International Affairs, 89:1 (2013), pp. 69-87; Elijah Nyaga Munyi, David  Mwambari and Aleksi Ylönen, Beyond History: 
African Agency in Development, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution (London, Rowman and Littlefield, 2020); Timothy M. Shaw, 
Fantu Cheru and Scarlett Cornelissen, Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); 
Rita Abrahamsen. Ǯnternational ǣǡǯǡ African Affairs 116:462 (2017), pp. 
125-139; Emma Louise Anderson Ǯǣependency through Shadow ǯǡ International Relations, 32:2 (2018), 194-217; Peace Medie, Global Norms and Local Action: The Campaigns to End 
Violence against Women in Africa, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019) 
22 Rita Abrahamsen, Ǯǡǡǣisions of World Order in Pan-AfricanismǯǡReview of 
International Studies 46:1 (2020), p.56Ǥ	ǡǮǯǡMunyi, Mwambari and Ylönen (2020), pp. 13-31, ch. 2. More broadly, this highlights the need for acknowledging and 
understanding the role of non-ǤǣǮ-Western 
Norm Shapers: Brǯǡ European Journal of International Security 2:1 (2017), pp. 88-110. 
23 Ǯǯ, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, available at:  {http://www.icty.org/en/about} accessed 
30 April 2018. 
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shift, from diplomacy to legality, in the conduct of world affairs. ?24 This development should 
be seen in the context of a gradual shift towards the juridification of international society.25 
 
The evolving retributive meaning-in-use of the TJN was, however, most powerfully 
represented and consolidated by the creation of the ICC in 1998. Cherif Bassiouni, a leading 
architect of the Court, suggested that the / ?Ɛ ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ could foreclose alternative 
interpretations of the TJN because it   ‘reminds governments that realpolitik, which sacrifices 
justice at the altar of political settlements, is no longer accepted ?.26 Similarly, Kofi Annan, the 
then UN Secretary General, explained that  ‘[t]here are times we are told justice should be put 
aƐŝĚĞ ? ?ď ?ƵƚǁĞŚĂǀĞĐŽŵĞƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĂƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚũƵƐƚŝĐĞƚŚĞƌĐĂŶďĞŶŽůĂƐƚŝŶŐƉĞĂĐĞ. ?27 
While the ICC like its forebears, the ICTY and the ICTR, does aim to make a contribution to the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts and to post-conflict reconciliation,28 it does so only as an 
ancillary, consequential objective through evidence-led, impartial prosecutions, rather than 
via intentional, politically motivated and strategic interventions aiming at facilitating political 
settlements and securing lasting peace. As Akhavan has argued, reconciliation  ‘can only be 
the incidental outcome of international criminal justice, and not its purpose ?.29 Indeed, a 
defining mission of the Court, enshrined in Article 27 of the Rome Statute, is to challenge the 
impunity of any actor, whether they are sitting heads of state or other senior officials, even 
where this might override competing political demands emanating from ongoing peace 
processes.30  
 
This position has been explicitly adopted in the Office of the WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌ ?ƐWŽůŝĐǇWĂƉĞƌŽŶƚŚĞ
Interests of Justice31 and has been reiterated by the Deputy Prosecutor:  ‘[w]hile the ICC 
 
24 Geoffrey Robertson QC, Crimes against Humanity. The Struggle for Global Justice (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 373. 
25 Joel. P. Trachtman, The Future of International Law. Global Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.1. 
26 Cherif M. Bassiouni,ǡǮǯǡ Cornell 
International Law Journal, 32:3 (1999), p.467. 
27 Secretary-
ǯStatement to the Inaugural Meeting of the Judges of the International Criminal Court, 11 March 
2003, The Hague in  Victor PeskinǡǮAn idea becoming real? The International Criminal Court and the limits of the cosmopolitan 
vision of justiceǯ in Roland Pierik and Wouter Werner (eds), Cosmopolitanism in Context. Perspectives from International Law and 
Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 211. 
28 ICC Website,ǡ Ǯǯǡǣȓhttps://www.icc-cpi.int/about} accessed on 12 June 2018 -ǮȏȐ
lasting peace. International criminal justice can contribute to long-term peace, stability and equitable development in post-conflict 
societiesǯ.; Ǯǯ- Ǯȏt]he Tribunal has laid the foundations for what is now the accepted norm for conflict resolution and 
post-ǯ, accessed on 12 June 2018. 
29 Payam AkhavanǡǮThe Rise, and Fall, and Rise, of International Criminal Justiceǯǡ Journal of International Criminal Justice, 11:3 
(2013), p.532. 
30 Kurt Mills and Alan Bloomfield, ǮAfrican resistance to the International Criminal Court: Halting the advance of the anti-impunity 
normǯ, Review of International Studies, 44:1 (2018),, p.102. 
31 Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court, ǮPolicy Paper on the Interests of Justice. September 2007ǯ, available at 
{https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf} 
accessed 9 September 2018, p.4. 
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Prosecutor bears in mind the application of other components of transitional justice, such as 
truth commission or reparations programs, her mandate obviously relates to the first 
component, namely, criminal prosecutions. ?32 Importantly, it should be noted that under the 
ZŽŵĞ ^ƚĂƚƵƚĞ ?Ɛ  ‘complementarity ? provisions, which place the primary responsibility on 
States Parties for discharging thĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ Wthe ICC being a mechanism of last resort 
 W states must implement retributive justice and are not permitted to adopt an alternative 
interpretation of the TJN norm which involves making use of, for example, truth and 
reconciliation commissions or amnesties as a means of facilitating the peaceful settlement of 
a conflict as an alternative to criminal prosecutions. Most recently, the Court insisted that 
prosecutions take place in Colombia and it rejected the use of blanket amnesties which had 
been used previously as part of a demobilisation process. The Deputy Prosecutor argued that 
 ‘[t]he ends of sustainable peace are intrinsically linked to justice being done and seen to be 
done. ? The meaning-in-use of the TJN adopted by the ICC is thus underpinned by the 
philosophical view that there can be no peace without retributive justice. As Nouwen and 
Werner explain, the ICC frames its mission as consolidating  ‘the road to global justice ? based 
upon what scholars have argued to be an implicit claim that its retributive meaning in-use of 
the TJN reflects a universally accepted standard of transitional justice.33 
 
While the work of the ICC, as described here, is defined by the mandate that it is given by 
states, as codified in the Rome Statute, it is not a multilateral institution that is controlled in 
its operations by its member states. It is a court that acts independently of its members when 
exercising its prosecutorial and judicial functions, and it has a substantial degree of agency in 
its operations. For example, the Chief Prosecutor has a choice about where, when and how 
to initiate and follow through investigations and prosecutions. The consequence of such 
agency is decision-making is that decisions should be subject to scrutiny and, if necessary, 
criticism. However, the broader confines within which ICC institutional agency can be 
exercised, as established by states, should also be open to scrutiny and criticism at a 
normative level, particularly where states have had an opportunity to understand how the 
 
32 James Stewart, Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal CourtǡǮ at the Conference on Transitional Justice in 
Colombia and the Role of the International Criminal Court Ǯole of the International ǯǡ Bogota (13 May 2015), available at: {https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-stat-13-05-2015-ENG.pdf} accessed 
9 September 2018, p. 5. 
33 Sarah M. H. Nouwen and Wouter G. Werner, ǮGlobal Justice: International Criminal Law as Challenge to Human 
DiversityǯǡJournal of International Criminal Justice, 13:1 (2015), pp.162-163. 
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Rome Statute operates in practice. It follows that just because a state acceded to the Rome 
Statute does not mean that it cannot subsequently criticise how it rules operate in practice or 
how they are implemented. 
 
It is also important to recognise how the Rome Statute was negotiated. A substantial and 
complex document was finally negotiated in just over one month in Rome with the 
consequence that it was a fast-moving process; as Kirsch ĂŶĚZŽďŝŶƐŽŶŶŽƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ
ǁĂƐĚĂƵŶƚŝŶŐďŽƚŚ ŝŶŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞĂŶĚĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇ ? ?34 Many states sent small, inexperienced 
and under-briefed delegations to the negotiations and therefore, despite the efforts of NGOs, 
they ǁĞƌĞŶŽƚĂůǁĂǇƐĂďůĞƚŽŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚǁĂƐŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐŝŶ ‘ƌĞĂůƚŝŵĞ ?ŽƌĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞeffectively 
to the negotiations.35 With many disagreements having been aired in respect of the content 
of the document, including the CŽƵƌƚ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ Prosecutor, and the role 
of the Security Council vis-à-vis the Court, agreement was reached and the statute adopted 
at the eleventh hour as a  ‘package-deal ? meaning that not all states would have been entirely 
pleased with the outcome but took the view that it was better to have something than 
nothing. The consequence of this was that issues with the interpretation and operation of the 
Rome Statute were bound to rear their head in the future, particularly as the operation of 
rules in practice became clear.  
 
In adĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ƚŚĞ/ ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŝŶ
Africa in particular have, as we will see below, generated tension with norm entrepreneurs in 
the Global South who have sought to broaden the palette of transitional justice mechanisms 
in order to consider  ‘questions about how to heal an entire society and incorporate diverse 
rule-of-law values, such as peace and reconciliation that had previously been treated as 
largely external to the transitional justice project ?.36 According to Mamdani, this was informed 
by the pressing desire for Southern states undergoing complicated political transitions to 
 ‘Prioritize peace over punishment, and explore forms of justice  W not criminal but political and 
social  W that will make reconciliation durable ?.37  
 
34 Phillipe Kirsch and Darryl ǡǮǯntonio. Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John 
R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary. Volume 1, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p.68. 
35 Fanny Benedetti, Karine Bonneau  and John L. Washburn, Negotiating the International Criminal Court. New York to Rome, 1994-
1998 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014), pp.95-96. 
36 Ruti G. TeiteǡǮTransitional Justice GenealogyǯǡHarvard Human Rights Journal, 16 (2003), pp. 69-94. 
37 Mahmood Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors. Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror, (London: Verso, 2009). p. 268. 
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We contend, therefore ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ/ ?ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĐƌŝƐŝƐŝŶĨƌŝĐĂƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞǀŝĞǁĞĚ W as the 
ICC and its supporters often claim  W to simply reflect  ‘justice ? being subverted through the 
realpolitik of African elites, but instead as part of broader normative struggle. This requires 
an understanding of African intellectual agency in global norm contestation and the manner 
in which African agents have sought to  ‘fill ? the contents of transnational norms through a 
creative process of bricolage. We develop this argument below by tracing the normative 
ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĞd:EĂŶĚŚŽǁƚŚŝƐŚĂƐŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ
ƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƌƵůŝŶŐƉĂƌƚǇƚŽůĞĂǀĞƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ? 
 
Bricolage ŝŶƚŚĞE ?Ɛ norm entrepreneurship   
 
During the struggle against apartheid the core diplomatic challenge confronting the ANC in 
exile was to forge a broad international coalition of actors opposed to the apartheid regime 
galvanized by a shared, unequivocal condemnation of the gross violation of human rights 
constituted by apartheid itself. During the 1970s and 1980s the ANC sought to intensify this 
pressure by advocating radical proposals for international criminal trials to be held according 
to the  ‘Nuremberg Principles ? where all actors who practiced, aided and/or abetted the crime 
of apartheid would be prosecuted according to international law. Although its overall foreign 
policy was incoherent at this stage,38 the ANC nonetheless managed to lobby consistently on 
this issue at the UN, leading to the hE ?ƐInternational Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid which advocated for a truly universal jurisdiction.39 
Once this was in force, the ANC called for the UN to compile  ‘a list of persons, from the highest 
echelons of the state machinery in South Africa to the murderers and torturers of the police 
force, who have been responsible for committing the crimes defined in the Convention ?.40  
 
As it became increasingly clear to ƚŚĞE ?ƐŚŝŐŚĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽ
overthrow the apartheid regime militarily and as prospects for a negotiated political 
 
38 Matthew Graham, The Crisis of South African Foreign Policy: Diplomacy, Leadership and the Role of the African National Congress. 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), pp. 6-39. 
39 UN, ǮInternational Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheidǯǡȋǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ available at: 
{https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201015/volume-1015-i-14861-english.pdf} accessed 7 July 2018. 
40 ANC (1987) ǮStatement from the Ǥǯǡ Johannesburg, 4 December 1987. Available at: 
{http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-arusha-conference} accessed 14 July 2018. 
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settlement grew, this shifted the E ?Ɛcalculations regarding what forms of justice for 
perpetrators of apartheid were desirable and attainable. Indeed, the scope for criminal 
prosecutions during a transition to democracy can vary, and in situations where the 
authoritarian regime has not  W and perhaps never will  W lose all power and control, there will 
always be a degree of co-determination of transitional justice between the  ‘old ? and  ‘new ? 
elites.41 
 
dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƐŝŐŶƐŽĨĂƐŚŝĨƚŝŶƚŚĞE ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞon transitional justice emerged during the period 
of secret talks about negotiations in the late 1980s. It was recognised by both sides that (as 
yet unofficial) indemnities, and eventually amnesties, were a practical necessity for those 
participating in the talks, while calculated prisoner swaps between the two sides helped to 
augment trust.42 As more formal talks progressed in the early 1990s, the move towards the 
acceptance of some form of amnesty provision became evident following meetings in early 
May, 1990, between an ANC delegation and President De Klerk and his officials. The 
agreement reached at these meetings  W the Groote Schuur Minute43 - set forward a clear 
commitment to accelerate discussions  ‘to advise on norms and mechanisms for dealing with 
the release of political prisoners and the granting of immunity in respect of political offences 
to those inside and outside South Africa. ?44 
 
While the indemnities prescribed at this stage were temporary, secretive talks between ANC 
officials and representatives of the National Party regime continued to raise the issues of 
general amnesty provision that might be needed in future.45 As formal negotiations gathered 
pace in the early 1990s, and the prospect of a majority government became increasingly likely, 
public deliberations about amnesty and transitional justice emerged within the ANC as its 
intellectuals began to debate the feasibility of both trials and the lustration of government 
officials. What began to emerge within the ANC was a consensus that retributive justice alone, 
in the form of criminal trials for the perpetrators of apartheid, was neither politically practical 
nor morally desirable. A particularly influential intervention was the proposal of  ‘sunset 
 
41 Ǯǣing with the PasǯǡLaw & Social Inquiry, 20:1 
(1995): p. 60. 
42 Willie Esterhuyse, Secret talks and the end of Apartheid (Cape Town, NB Publishers, 2012), p 145 
43 ANC (1990) The Groote Schuur Minute. Declaration, Cape Town, 4 May. 
44 ANC (1990) The Groote Schuur Minute. Declaration, Cape Town, 4 May. 
45 Esterhuyse Ǯǯǡ p. 289 
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clauses ? that would offer three areas of compromise. First, they proposed power sharing for 
a fixed number of years with what would later be referred to in ANC discussions as a 
 ‘Government of National Unity ?.46 This would serve to co-opt powerful components of the 
former regime willing to make compromises while marginalising right-wing nationalists who 
refused to embrace the new political order. Second, the ANC acknowledged the need to 
maintain a functioning state that could be utilised for the next phase of their  ‘National 
Democratic Revolution. ? It would therefore be necessary to find accommodation for large 
sections of the civil service, including making offers of job security, because the risk of not 
doing so was clear:  ‘Precisely because racism gave [the white minority] a monopoly of skills 
and experience, their potential for destabilising a newly born democracy is enormous ?.47 
 
Third, to enable this accommodation of state elites and civil servants compromise was also 
required with regard to the prosecution of those responsible for the various crimes of 
apartheid. According to ANC senior figure Kadar Asmal, the ANC was confronted with striking 
a difficult  ‘balancing act ?, and that while criminal prosecutions could provide the kind of 
unfettered transition required by some who wanted  ‘a vivid line between the old illegitimacy 
and the new democracy ?, they would not satisfy  ‘the need to rehabilitate a bureaucracy that 
is needed to serve the new ideals [of a democratic government], and so cannot be dismissed 
or imprisoned ?.48 The ANC calculated from an early stage that while prosecutions might be 
desirable, the threat of prosecution might inhibit the negotiations process, and endanger a 
transition.49 
 
The agreements regarding the need for indemnity and amnesty provisions set forward in the 
Groote Schuur Minute paved the way for a gradual formalisation and expansion of amnesty 
provision in the Indemnity Acts (1990), Further Indemnity Act (1992), the  ‘National Unity and 
Reconciliation ? clause of the 1993 Interim Constitution and, eventually, the Amnesty Act 
(1995). The inclusion of this amnesty provision was seen as a breakthrough by leading 
 
46 ANC. (1992) ǮAnnexure to the statement by State President FW De Klerk on the timetable for Further Constitutional Reformǯǡ
Johannesburg, (26 November 1993), available at: {http://www.anc.org.za/content/background-paper-annexure-statement-state-
president-fw-de} accessed 17 September 2018. 
47 Joe Slovo, ǮNegotiations: What room for compromise?ǯǡ African Communist, 130:3 (1992). 
48 ǡǮǡeconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience in Perspecǯǡǡ ? ?ǣ ?
(2000), p. 14. 
49 ANC Resolutions of the National Consultative Conference. Conference Resolutions, Johannesburg (1990). Available at: 
{http://www.anc.org.za/content/resolutions-national-consultative-conference} accessed 17 September 2018. 
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protagonists, such as Desmond Tutu, who remarked at the time that:  ‘Amnesty made our 
ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ? it was only when that was put in that the boer signed the negotiations, 
opening the door to elections ?.50 While the ANC thought that this compromise might forestall 
a  ‘counterrevolutionary ? movement emerging, their leading intellectuals were nonetheless 
cognisant of the fact that this represented only a partial transition, leaving the new 
government with a civil service  ‘steeped in the precepts of apartheid ?.51 
 
However, it would be wrong to portray this as simply a triumph of the pragmatic promotion 
of peace at the expense of accountability and justice by a party itching to assume power and 
to subsequently put the past to bed. This ignores the normative agency of those within the 
ANC (and wider civil society) who embraced a form of bricolage in their design and application 
of the transitional justice norm. dŚĞ E ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂl discussion magazine, Mayibuye, in 
particular, featured a discussion of  ‘^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? during the 
transition period, documenting the lessons the ANC could draw from the varied experiences 
of trials, amnesty provisions and truth commissions in South America, as well as weighing up 
the practical and political consequences of embracing Nuremberg-style prosecutions of the 
apartheid regime.52 These internal discussion documents reflected on a series of intensive 
conferences in Cape Town during February and July 1994 in which activists and politicians 
responsible for transitional justice in South America, as well as prominent intellectuals from 
the ANC and South African civil society, debated what could be learned from the experiences 
of those countries. 53  
 
A shared understanding which developed during these exchanges was that South Africa could 
take inspiration  W but not a rigid blueprint  W from international experiments. During the Cape 
Town conferences it was agreed by leading delegates these countries emerging from mass 
violence and/or authoritarianism were confronted with a myriad of problems to deal with, 
and that challenging the impunity of those who had committed gross violations of human 
 
50 quoted in Faustin Ntoubandi (2007). Amnesty for Crimes Against Humanity Under International Law. (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2007). p. 15 
51 Harold Wolpe, Ǯpartheid in South Africaǯǡ Transformation 27 (1995), pp. 86-101. 
52 ANC (various authors) Ǯontextǯǡ Mayibuye Volumes 6 and 7 (1995 - 1996). available at: 
{http://www.anc.org.za/publication/Mayibuye} accessed 17 September 2018. 
53 The proceedings of the two conferences were published in AlǡǮǣǯȋǡǡ ? ? ? ?ȌBoraine, and Janet Levy (eds.) Healing of 
a nation? (Cape Town, Justice in Transition, 1995) 
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rights was part of a wider calculation involving experimental approaches and compromises. 
As Dullah Omar put it,  ‘I do not claim that we have all the answers or that we have the right 
answers. We need to find what former Chilean president Patricio Aylwin has called  “the right 
equilibrium ?. ?54 Leading intellectuals argued that this  ‘equilibrium ? in South Africa was to be 
found through selective prosecutions in some cases coupled with the formation of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and conditional amnesties. For the ANC, a more holistic 
notion of  ‘justice ? was therefore required, which would blend prosecution (where desirable 
and possible) with truth commissions, which would be victim-centred and aimed at providing 
as much  ‘shared memory ? about the past as possible, while also offering participants a 
potential platform for public penitence and forgiveness.55 As Ntoubandi argues,  ‘South 
African amnesty had a distinctive feature in that it was not based on oblivion or forgetfulness. 
Instead, it aimed to provide a  “full disclosure ? of past wrongs so as to allow all South Africans 
to remember, and not to forget, the crimes committed in the past. ?56 Indeed, as one leading 
ANC intellectual put it, the party realised that  ‘transitional justice was not a mere matter of 
criminal trials ? it had to be part of a systematic process of acknowledging the illegitimacy of 
apartheid ? and that  ‘impunity can be avoided and accountability achieved, by public 
disclosure of wrongdoing ?.57 
 
dŚĞEŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůapproach to transitional justice58, which would eventually 
include a blend of a trials, conditional amnesties,  ‘sunset clauses ? and truth commissions, thus 
reflected a form of bricolage: the reuse, repurposing and remoulding of a range of resources 
and practices available  ‘to hand ? to assemble a dynamic and idiosyncratic path towards a 
practically achievable and morally defensible transitional justice settlement. The bricolage 
approach taken in South Africa was therefore not simply a pragmatic compromise. It was 
deemed by its protagonists  W with reference to the South American experiences  W the best 
 
54 DullaǡǮ	ǯ (1995), p. 8. 
55 This was a view advanced in the Cape Town conferences by leading civil society figures like Rev Frank Chikane and ANC leaders 
like Albie Sachs Ǥǯ
offered by Paul Gready, Ǯǣ
and Beyondǯ (Abingdon, Routledge, 2010). 
56 Ntoubandi (2007), p. 61. 
57 Asmal (2000), p. 13 
58 This approach, it should be noted, is not without its critics. See Mahmood Mamdani, Amnesty or impunity? A Preliminary Critique 
of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. diacritics, 32:3/4 (2002), pp. 33-59; Sisonke Msimang, ǮAll 
Is Not Forgiven: South Africa and the Scars of Apartheidǯ, Foreign Affairs. 97 (2018), pp. 28-34; Matthew Evans, Transformative 
Justice: Remedying Human Rights Violations Beyond Transition (Abingdon, Routledge, 2018). 
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way to fulfil an ambitious project of political and moral reconstruction59  and by ANC leaders 
as a way to inculcate a new  ‘human rights culture ? underpinned by an active,  ‘vigilant 
citizenship ? across all sections of society that could acknowledge the wrongs of the past and 
guard the new society against future abuses.60 As we will discuss below, the details of the 
E ?ƐŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƐŚŝĨƚĨƌŽŵŝƚƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇƵŶĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂůƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĞƚƌŝďƵƚŝǀĞũƵƐƚŝĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ
1970s and 1980s towards this more flexible, bricolage approach helps us to understand the 
E ?ƐƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŶŽƌŵĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌƐŚŝƉŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌĞŶĂ ? 
 
The E ?Ɛ ?export ? of a transitional justice bricolage  
TŚĞE ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂƐĂůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐŝƚƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂŶĚ
the party claims that its foreign policy traces its lineage to anti-colonial struggles dating back 
centuries, and that its cornerstone is a form of  ‘Progressive Internationalism ? driven by a 
demand for  ‘a world shaped not just by the aspiration and interests of the Western world, 
but one also shaped by African demands ?.61  It is in the area of conflict mediation and peace 
building that South Africa has arguably been most influential in pressing forward an African 
agenda. dŚŝƐďĞŐĂŶŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶǁŚĞŶĨƌŝĐĂŶƐƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚ
the international community looked to South Africa to take a leading role in peace building 
on the continent  W often with quite unrealistic expectations.62 The ANC government was 
quickly invited to take on mediation roles across the continent by figures such as Julius 
Nyerere, who in 1994 urged Mandela and the ANC to commit to re-energising peace building 
efforts in the Great Lakes region. Successive ANC governments were happy to embrace an 
extensive role in peace building activities. ANC leaders demonstrated a proclivity to assume a 
vanguardist posture, contending that their own experience of assembling a complex bricolage 
of mechanisms to achieve their own transition offered a  ‘rich and complex model from which 
much can be learned, whatever its inevitable flaws ?.63 Indeed, even from the early 1990s 
during negotiations, this self-confidence was already apparent in the way the ANC sought to 
intervene in the peace process in Northern Ireland, and expanded as ANC leaders sought to 
influence conflict mediation and transitional justice processes across the African continent, 
 
59 For example, former president of Chile Patricio Aylwin, among others, made these arguments at the Cape Town conferences. See 
Boraine and Levy (1995). 
60 	Ǯǯ, in Boraine and Levy (1995), p. 23. 
61 AE ‘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ PŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ ? ?EŽŶŐƌĞƐƐ ? ? ?:ŽŚĂŶŶĞƐďƵƌŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?3. 
62 Graham (2015), p. 126 
63 Asmal (2000), p.23 
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including Burundi, Zaire (DRC), Liberia, Angola, Nigeria, Libya, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, the 
ŽŵŽƌŽƐ ?<ĞŶǇĂ ?^ƵĚĂŶĂŶĚŽƚ ?/ǀŽŝƌĞ ?As Chris Landsberg notes in his detailed study of 
South African mediation efforts, at the core of the approach was the belief that calculations 
of what combinations of mechanisms and practices might be useful should be conducted on 
a  ‘case by case ? approach, rather than imposing a singular, rigid formula. 64 South African 
mediators would initially seeks to ferment conditions for talks between all important actors 
so that appropriate combinations of  ‘old ? and  ‘new ? mechanisms for achieving a way forward 
could be identified, often including power-sharing agreements and bespoke combinations 
and adaptations of different transitional justice mechanisms (e.g. truth commissions, 
amnesties, and prosecutions).  
The ANC government has faced considerable criticism, both domestically and internationally, 
where its application of this approach is argued to assume that some form of political 
ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůŽĨ^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐŝƐ always possible.65 Critics have also argued that 
the approach has, in some cases, unduly favoured powerful incumbents, failed to secure 
peace, and/or simply reflected the pursuit of ^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛnational interest at the expense 
of other objectives.66 However, we should not ignore the  normative content  ŽĨƚŚĞE ?Ɛ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ĞŶŵĞƐŚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ ůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ, its 
understandings of its own transition, and its ambitions for reforming international politics.67 
While it was assuming this leading role in African mediation, South Africa was also investing 
considerable political capital into provoking wider normative shifts on the continent regarding 
state sovereignty and responsibility, including helping to build a wide array of institutional 
mechanisms in the AU that would place greater emphasis on African states taking 
responsibility for the promotion and protection of human rights.68 
 
South Africa also made a significant contribution to the formation of the ICC. It was one of a 
limited number of states involved in the extensive preparatory negotiations which took place 
throughout the early 1990s and it played a prominent and active role during the Rome 
 
64 Chris Landsberg, The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa's Transition, (Johannesburg: Jacana 
Media, 2004). 
65 Gérard Prunier ǮǫǯǡǡǤȋȌǡ 
Africa's Peacemaker? Lessons from South African Conflict Mediation. (Johannesburg: Jacana Media 2009), pp. 95-112. 
66 Lynch (2018). 
67 ǡǮǡdeaǣ ?ǯǡǡ ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ, pp. 55-74. 
68 Kurt Shillinger ǮLearning from South African engagement in Africaǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǤ ? ?-24. 
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Conference in 1998. South Africa had one of the most cosmopolitan and hopeful visions of 
the Court, and supported the Court having an extensive jurisdiction and proprio motu powers 
for the prosecutor. It was also unfazed by the Court being able to exercise jurisdiction over 
non-States Parties, all of which were quite radical cosmopolitan ideas. In a show of its strong 
support for the Court, South Africa voted in favour of adopting the Rome Statute and signed 
it on the day it was opened for signature, ratifying it two years later. During this period South 
Africa embraced a form of bridge Wbuilding behaviour. This entailed lobbying for truth 
commissions to be included in Article 17 as part of an attempt to broaden the / ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ
to transitional justice and to enhance the complementary role it could play in relation to 
African-led peace mediation efforts.69 As Dire Tladi notes,  ‘While South Africa has not been 
shy, not only at AU events, but also so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘/ĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ ?ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽŵĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ
of the Court, it has also sought to lower the anti-ICC sentiments at AU events ?.70 
 
It is therefore important to understand the long-standing tension that underpins South 
ĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƉŽƐƚ-apartheid foreign policy under the ANC: On the one hand, South Africa sees value 
in shaping global liberal norms through its multilateral engagements such that they can be 
harnessed to promote African  ‘renaissance ? in the form of democratic peace and prosperity. 
On the other hand, its deeply-embedded (and growing71) scepticism regarding Western 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ĨƌŝĐĂ ŝŵďƵĞƐ ŝƚƐ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ŵĂŬĞƌƐ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ďĞůŝĞĨ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
actors and institutions should play only an auxiliary role to African actors when confronting 
African problems. In terms of conflict mediation and transitional justice, this manifests in an 
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ĚĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ E ?Ɛ ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽŶ ǁŚĂƚ
combinations of peacebuilding mechanisms might work in a particular situation. This tension 
is highlighted in its increasingly strained relationship with the ICC. ANC government officials 
ŚĂǀĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚƐ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ / ?ƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚǁĂƐĂŶĞĨĨŽƌƚ ƚŽ
buttress a wider transitional justice norm. As the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
remarked to Parliament  ‘South Africa has never viewed the ICC in isolation, but as one 
element in a new system of international justice, law and governance. It must therefore be 
 
69 ǡǮǣ Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Courtǯ, The Hague, 18 Ȃ 26 
November 2015), available at: {http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2015/mash1118.htm} accessed 17 September 2018. 
70 Dire Tladi (2015) ǮThe Duty on South Africa to Arrest and Surrender President Al-Bashir Under South African and International 
Law: A Perǯǡ Journal of International Criminal Justice, 13:5 (2015), p. 1030. 
71 This is evident in the Ǯanti-imperialǯ tone of recent foreign policy discussion documents and pronouncements, particularly 
following the NATO intervention in Libya, where the ANC has actively welcomed the gradual replacement of a unipolar world order 
under US leadership with the multi-polar future it sees with the rise of China and other emerging powers.  
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the last resort to protect human rights and to fight impunity ?72, or what scholars have called 
its  ‘backstop ? function.73 dŚŝƐ ?ĂƐǁĞǁŝůůĞǆƉĂŶĚďĞůŽǁ ?ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐĂĐŽƌĞƐƚƌĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞE ?Ɛ
growing exasperation with the ICC: what it perceives to be the tendency of the Court to 
promote its agenda in Africa without due regard for African promotion of more flexible, 
bricolage approaches to promoting transitional justice as part of a wider element of 
peacebuilding.   
 
tŚĂƚǁĞŶƚǁƌŽŶŐ ?^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƚƵƌďƵůĞŶƚƌĞůationship with the ICC 
 
While the ANC government has engaged critically with the ICC over a number of years, the 
turning point in its relationship occurred with its refusal to arrest Omar al-Bashir, the 
president of Sudan, when he travelled to South Africa to attend an AU summit in June 2015. 
At that time al-Bashir was subject to two ICC arrest warrants issued in 2009 and 2010 for war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and as a State Party to the Rome Statute it 
was said that South Africa was obligated to arrest and surrender al-Bashir to the ICC. After 
the incident, various legal proceedings took place concerning the ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛfailure to 
arrest al-Bashir. The South African government was found to have acted unlawfully by the 
domestic courts74, and the ICC found that South Africa as a State Party to the Rome Statute 
had failed to discharge its obligations of arrest and surrender required by the Statute.75 The 
ANC government however maintained throughout these proceedings that it was under no 
obligation to arrest al-Bashir in light of the immunity that attaches to his position as a sitting 
head of state and it also raised normative arguments about immunity.76  
 
 
72 Michael Masutha. ǮǯǯǡStatement to National 
Assembly, (23 November 2016). available at: {https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Docs/hansard/cd41a47c-5b5b-
4921-8cb4-b5a357477ab4.pdf}  accessed 17 September 2018. 
73 Max du Plessis, ǮSouth Africa's International Criminal Court Act: Countering Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanityǯǡ 
Institute for Security Studies Papers, 172 (2008): p. 1. 
74 Southern African Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and others (Case no.27740/2015), 
Judgment of the High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria), 24 June 2015, available at: 
{http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2015/402.pdf} accessed on 20 May 2019; The Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and others v Southern African Litigation Centre and others (Case no.867/15), Judgment of the Supreme Court of South 
Africa, 15 March 2016, available at {http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2016/17.pdf} accessed on 20 May 2019. 
75
 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on 
the non-compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir, 6 July 2017, 
available at: {https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_04402.PDF} accessed 20 May 2020. 
76 While the government had initially suggested that al-Bashir had immunity by virtue of attending an international summit, it later 
clarified its position that his immunity derived from his position as a sitting head of state under customary international law. 
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During the course of the ICC proceedings, the ANC government took the drastic and 
unexpected decision to withdraw South Africa from the Rome Statute.77 Its response to the 
whole situation, including its decision to withdraw from the Court, was met with 
consternation. It was widely alleged that it had betrayed its long-standing commitment to a 
human rights-led foreign policy, and that taking steps to withdraw from the Rome Statute 
demonstrated that  ‘ƚŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŽƚĂŬĞŝƚƐƉůĂĐĞĂŵŽŶŐĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ
old despots and not among its new democrats. ?78  
 
The existing academic commentary has also tended to suggest that the ANC government 
faced a binary choice between upholding its commitments to human rights or prioritising the 
realpolitik of its alliances on the continent. Franziska Boehme79, for example, frames the 
matter as a stark choice for the ANC government, which  ‘faced a loyalty conflict in which it 
had to choose between its commitment to the AU and its commitment to the ICC ? and that 
ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ‘non-ĂƌƌĞƐƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝǌĞĚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ
over its global reputation as a human rights supporter. ? Others have noted how the incident 
allowed South Africa to  ‘score very critical points in its representation of African interests 
globally ? which has bolstered its regional influence.80 Indeed, such a view is supported by Mills 
and Bloomfield, who contend that the incident reflected how South Africa had  ‘privileged 
African solidarity over human rights ? and that, in this respect, South Africa had  ‘traversed 
almost the full range of the norm dynamics role-spectrum ? by going from being an 
entrepreneur of the  ‘anti-impunity ? norm to being at the  ‘tipping point ? of taking an 
 ‘antipreneurial ? stance in relation to this norm.81  
 
These arguments are helpful for highlighting some of the dilemmas confronted by the ANC 
government but there are ƐĞǀĞƌĂůƌĞĂƐŽŶƐďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞE ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŽǀĞƌůŽŽŬĞĚŝŶ
such accounts. First, the ANC government was of the opinion that it was not obligated to 
 
77 UǡǮNotification of South Africa of Withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Courǯǡ 19 October 2016, UN 
Doc. C.N.786.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Depository Notification), available at: 
{https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.786.2016-Eng.pdf} accessed on 30 May 2019. 
 
78 ǡǮǯǡǡrongǯǡǡvailable at: 
{https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2015-06-25-why-lindiwe-zulus-sarcastic-hubris-is-wrong-wrong-wrong/} accessed 17 
September 2018. 
79 Franziska ǡǮǮWe Chose Africaǯ: South Africa and the Regional Politics of Cooperation with the International Criminal Courtǯǡ 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, 11:1 (2017), p. 50. 
80 Christopher Isike and Ǯǯǯǡ Politikon 
44:1 (2017), p. 174. 
81 Mills and Bloomfield (2018), p. 118 
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arrest al-Bashir because he had immunity by virtue of his position as a current head of state 
of a non-^ƚĂƚĞWĂƌƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚĚŝĚŶŽƚĨĂŝůƚŽĐŽŵƉůǇǁŝƚŚŝƚƐŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞZŽŵĞ
Statute by not arresting and surrendering Omar Al Bashir. ?82 This was argued extensively by 
the ANC government before South African national courts, including the Supreme Court, and 
before the ICC.83 It was also a position shared by the AU.84 The legitimacy of such a position  
cannot be dismissed as simply a  ‘cover story ? for the ANC particularly in light of the complexity 
of the legal issues with which the courts had to grapple in considering the issue of immunity 
and because there were many highly reputed lawyers who supported the ANC ?Ɛ 
interpretation of the law.85 The ANC was also critical of the fact that ICC Judges had long failed 
to articulate a consistent and coherent legal justification as to why al-Bashir did not benefit 
from immunity which meant that the ICC position on immunity was lacking in authority,86 
criticism also made by commentators.87 The ANC government was ultimately of the view  W 
whether rightly or wrongly - that it was not possible for South Africa to remain a State Party 
when there were seemingly conflicting arrest and immunity obligations. 
 
Second, the political coŶƚĞǆƚŝŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐƚŚĞEŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŽǀĞƌĂů-Bashir and the 
timing of its subsequent threat to withdraw from the Rome Statute was complex. As authors 
like Bohme referred to above are right to argue, the arrival of al-Bashir in South Africa did 
provoke an immediate dilemma for the ANC government. On the one hand, choosing to arrest 
Bashir risked straining its relationships with some African allies. It would have also aggravated 
a powerful nationalist-populist faction of the ruling party that was aligned to the then 
president Jacob Zuma, and also risked bolstering the appeal of ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ^ ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐůĞĨƚŝƐƚ
 
82 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Submission from the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa from the purposes of proceedings under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute, 17 March 2017, available at: 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_01350.PDF} accessed 20 May 2019, §52 
83 Ǯfrom the Government of the Republic of South AfricaǯǤ 
84 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05- ? ?Ȁ ? ? ?ǡǯǮHashemite ǯǮ ? ?ȋ ?Ȍ-Compliance by Jordan with the 
Request by the Court for the Arrest and Surrender [of] Omar Al-Baǯ, 13 July 2018, available at: {https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_03735.PDF} accessed 20 May 2019. 
85 See, for example: Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Southern African Litigation Centre in the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa (Case No. CCT 75/16), Written Submissions of the First Amici Curiae: John Dugard and Guénaël Mettraux (13 
October 2016), §31; 
ǤǡǮ-Bashir & the ICC: ǯǡ Chinese Journal of International 
Law, 12:3 (2013), pp.487-500; 
ǡǮǫǯǡJournal of International 
Criminal Justice, 7:2 (2009) 7(2), p.323. 
86 UǡǮNotification of South Africa of WithdrawalǯǡǤ ?ǤSee also, ǮSubmission from the Government of the Republic of South Africaǯ, 
§75-80. 
87 William ǡǮǡǡǯǡPhD studies in human rights, available at: {http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/obama-medvedev-
and-hu-jintao-may-be.html} accessed on 23 July 2018; Dire ǡǮ
ǣȀǯǡ African Journal of Legal Studies, 7:3 (2014),, p.392. 
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opposition.88 On the other hand, opting not to arrest al-Bashir would generate international 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞEŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ liberal identity , while also, less significantly (for 
the party), generating domestic opposition from the Democratic Alliance and civil society. The 
ANC government no doubt factored in these immediate concerns into its decision to let al-
Bashir leave the country. However, the wider geopolitical context cannot be ignored. The ANC 
had become increasingly critical of Western powers since the fallout from the NATO 
intervention in Libya in 2011, and its internal discussion documents from its 2012 congress 
onward reflect a heightened distrust of the  ‘imperial ? powers of the West and a growing faith 
that South Africa would be able to become more assertive within a reconfigured, multipolar 
world order characterised by the rise of the BRICS.89 
 
Third, these political considerations, while important, were not the only factors driving the 
E ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐŽŶƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞ ?do portray this move as simply an immediate knee jerk 
decision to favour African alliances or, alternatively, to frame this as a dramatic normative 
volte-face in which the ANC reversed its position on human rights promotion and combating 
impunity, ignores the nuance of long-standing norm contestation between the ANC and the 
ICC over how best to operationalise transitional justice. /ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ǁĞĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞE ?Ɛ
bricolage approach to promoting the TJN cannot be so easily captured within framings of 
binary oppositions and zero-sum trade-offs between normative commitments and realpolitik, 
human rights and autocrats, African solidarity and liberal cosmopolitanism, or impunity and 
anti-impunity. Instead, thŝƐ ĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ E ?Ɛ ĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ƚŽǁŚĂƚ ŝƚ
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞƐ ƚŽďĞ ƚŚĞ / ?Ɛ ŶĂƌƌŽǁand self-defeating operationalisation of the TJN in some 
situations, which it claims both hinders the political settlement of ongoing conflicts and 
inhibits South Africa playing a role in conflict resolution.  
 
This contestation  W and the subsequent breakdown of relations between South Africa and the 
ICC  W must therefore be traced back to the initial arrest warrants against al-Bashir in 2009. 
Our aim is not to take sides in this dispute, in terms of whether South Africa was  ‘right ? to take 
the positions it has vis-à-vis Bashir and the ICC. We are instead concerned here with 
 
88 For a detailed examination of how these factions were shaping up at this time see Alexander Beresford, ǯ
Crisis: Unfinished Liberation and Fractured Class Struggles (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2016) pp. 25-46. 
89 ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǢǮǣiscussion documentǯǡ (March 2017), available at 
[https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/international-relations-anc-discussion-document-20} accessed 21 January 2019.  
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highlighting how the bricolage approach to norm development favoured by the ANC came 
into conflict with the prerogatives of the ICC and therefore what the concept of bricolage 
might highlight for us, more broadly, in terms of how we understand the complex politics of 
norm contestation.  
 
The contestation over the meaning-in-use of the TJN in Sudan  
The ANC ŚĂƐ ƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇ ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ďĞůŝĞĨ ƚŚĂƚ ^ŽƵƚŚ ĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ƉůĂĐĞƐ ƚŚĞ E
government in a unique position to act as a conflict mediator in Sudan because, as the then 
Deputy Foreign Minister Sue Van Der Merwe argued,  ‘The current conflict in Sudan has its 
roots in the very forces that kept South Africa as the last outpost of colonialism on the 
continent, namely, racism and the artificial separation of the African people within and across 
borders ?.90 South Africa has therefore assumed a leading role in conflict mediation and peace 
building in Sudan (and subsequently South Sudan  W where its leaders have recently mediated 
between factions to agree a Transitional Government of National Unity91); a role that it frames 
as central to wider efforts of promoting peace and stability across the continent, and that in 
this respect Sudan  ‘has the potential to occupy the front ranks in the African Renaissance ?.92  
 
dŚĞE ?Ɛ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĨŽƌŵĞƌƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚdŚĂďŽDďĞŬŝĂŶĚĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚǇƌŝů
Ramaphosa, have been at the forefront of this diplomacy, and South African officials have led 
a variety of diplomatic initiatives and high-level panels on behalf of the African Union,93 
including leading the talks that would eventually culminate with the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. In addition to committing troops for 
peacekeeping, South Africa has also played an active role in efforts to build the capacity of 
the main parties involved in the conflict  W evoking the  ‘lessons ? that could be learned from 
the ANC with regards to developing party  ‘cadres ? with the political intelligence and capacity 
to lead efforts to reconcile Sudanese society and to govern effectively in the national interest. 
As noted by the then foreign minister, this has been further promoted through South African-
 
90 Susan Van De Merwe, ǮFarewell Messageǯǡ Pretoria, (14 April 2005). available at: 
{http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2005/merw0414.htm} accessed 17 September 2018. 
91 Acting as AU Chairperson, Cyril Ramaphosa is said to have led the talks with both sides. 
{http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2020/au0220.htm} accessed 10 April 2020 
92 Jef Radebe (2011) ǮUnited Nations Security Council DebatǯǡYork (14 July 2011) available at: 
{http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2011/rade0714.html} accessed 17 September 2018. 
93 ǯ-Conflict Reconstruction in Sudan and the AU High Level Implementation 
Panel led by Thabo Mbeki. 
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led training of Sudanese (and South Sudanese) civil servants, police and ministers in all areas 
of government.94 
 
The ANC government has engaged in  ‘quiet diplomacy ? with the al-Bashir government, opting 
to engage  ‘constructively ? with the regime rather than joining western powers in denouncing 
human rights violations, which they argue would risk alienating the government and blocking 
negotiations. This has included attempts to dilute interventions against the regime, including 
sanctions95, and also public backing from South African presidents for al-Bashir for what they 
controversially called his  ‘exceptional leadership ? in relation to perceived progress made on 
the CPA and South Sudanese independence.96 The deeply-rooted conflict entrenched in 
ƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůǇ ŝŶƐƵƌŵŽƵŶƚĂďůĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ? ƚŚĞ E ?Ɛ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ŚĂǀĞ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? ďĞ
addressed by some form of  ‘quick fix ? solution of attempting to force regime change through 
a  ‘judicial coup ? arranged by the ICC.97 South African mediators have instead argued that the 
threat of prosecuting of incumbent heads of state in such scenarios can be counter-
productive because it ignores the need for elite accommodation for what they call  ‘long-
lasting ? peace. A commonly aired sentiment by ANC leaders is that the threat of punitive 
sentencing in Sudan would mean that  ‘belligerents have no incentive to settle disputes for 
fear that they will locked up the day after the resolution of the conflict ? and that  ‘it was 
appreciation of this reality that informed the ANC to make necessary accommodations to the 
apartheid leaders ? in the early 1990s.98 /ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ? ƚŚĞ E ?Ɛ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƉƌŽƚĂŐŽŶŝƐƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
mediation of the conflict have consistently asserted that no side within the conflict  W nor the 
African mediators  W saw the prosecution of al-Bashir as desirable in the short term. For 
example, Thabo Mbeki, who played a central role in the mediation, argues that: 
 
The challenge thĂƚĂƌŝƐĞƐŝƐǁŚĞŶƐŽŵĞŽŶĞƐĂǇƐ ?the issues of justice trumps the issue 
of peace. ? If you talk to the South Sudanese, [for example], if you talk to the South 
 
94 Nkoana Mashabane, Ǯall on President of Government of Southern Sudan, Salva Kirr Mayarditǯǡ
Juba (17 September 2009), available at: {http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2009/mash0917.html} accessed 17 September 
2018. 
95 Nathan (2011). 
96 Indeed, Mbeki was ǯǡǡ-Bashir during a 2004 visit. See also DIRCO, ǮSouth African Government's response to the recent military confrontation between the Republic of Sudan and South Sudanǯǡ
Pretoria (30 March 2012), available at {http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2012/suda0402.html} accessed 17 September 2018). 
97 ANC, ǮNational Executive Committee Statementǯǡȋ29 September 2013). available at: 
{http://www.anc.org.za/content/nec-statement} accessed 17 September 2018. 
98 For example: ǡǮThe implications of the attendance and departure of President Omar Al-Bashir from the African Union 
Summit in South Africa. Speech to National Assembly. Cape Town, (23 July 2015), available at: 
{http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/albashir-history-will-absolve-us--lindiwe-zulu} accessed 17 September 2018. 
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^ƵĚĂŶĞƐĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ^ĂůǀĂ<ŝŝƌ ?ĂŶĚĂƐŬŚŝŵ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚĂƐŚŝƌďĞƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŽ
ƚŚĞ,ĂŐƵĞ ? ?,ĞǁŝůůƐĂǇ ?ŶŽ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ŶĞĞĚŚŝŵĨŽƌƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞƚŚĂƚwe are trying to 
ŵĂŬĞŚĞƌĞ ? ?ƵƚǇŽƵŬŶŽǁƚŚĞƌĞǁŝůůďĞƐŽŵĞŽŶĞƐĂǇŝŶŐĨƌŽŵŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĂƚŶŽ ?ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ
ŝƐ ŵŽƌĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĞĂĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ǇŽƵ ĂƌĞ ĂĨƚĞƌ ? ? EŽǁ ?ǇŽƵ ĐĂŶ ŝŵĂŐŝŶĞ ǁŚĂƚ
would have happened in our case in South Africa if the International Criminal Court 
ǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞƐĂŝĚ ?ĂƌƌĞƐƚĞ<ůĞƌŬĂŶĚƚĂŬĞŚŝŵƚŽƚŚĞ,ĂŐƵĞ. ?We 
would have refused. We would have said no because what we need to do is end 
apartheid and we need President De Klerk here to lead this white population into the 
democratic settlement. We would never have agreed that justice must trump this, even 
though we were saying that apartheid is a crime against humanity.99 
 
From the outset, therefore, South Africa argued for the AU to call for a deferral of the arrest 
warrant against al-Bashir on 4th March 2009. South African policy makers argued that while 
they and the AU would support some form of ICC prosecutions for those responsible for the 
violence, they were concerned that if this was done too soon that it  ‘could seriously 
undermine the ongoing efforts aimed at facilitating the early resolution of the conflict in 
Darfur and the promotion of long-lasting peace and reconciliation in the Sudan as a 
ǁŚŽůĞ ? ?.100 dŚŝƐƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĂďŽƵƚƉĞĂĐĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂůƐŽĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽ^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ
reluctance to arrest al-Bashir, and the ANC government has held on to the line that heads of 
state must continue to be able to engage in international diplomacy, and that as such:  ‘We 
wish to give effect to the rule of customary international law which recognises the diplomatic 
immunity of heads of state and others in order to effectively promote dialogue and the 
peaceful resolutioŶŽĨĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐǁŚĞƌĞǀĞƌƚŚĞǇŵĂǇŽĐĐƵƌ ? ? ?.101  
 
However, it is also important to note that a more substantive dispute emerged over the scope 
for political deliberation within the ICC, specifically around Article 97 consultations regarding 
the arrest of al-Bashir. This provision of the Rome Statute provides for consultations to take 
place between a State Party and the Court where the former identifies issues that may impede 
 
99 Thabo Mbeki ǮJustice cannot trump peace. Interview with Al Jazeeraǯǡȋ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ȍvailable at: 
{https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2013/11/thabo-mbeki-justice-cannot-trump-peace-
2013112210658783286.html?xif=} accessed 17 September 2018. 
100 DIRCOǡǮJoint Communiqué issued at the Conclusion of the Working Visit of H.E. President Thabo Mbeki of the Republic of South 
Africa to the Republic of the Sudanǯǡ (16 September 2008) available at: {http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2008/suda0916.html} 
accessed 17 September 2018. 
101 DIRCO (2008). 
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its ability to discharge obligations it owes to the latter under the Rome Statute, such as in 
respect of the arrest and surrender of suspects. ANC government officials attempted to use 
these consultations to raise concerns but were incensed when the Court merely repeated its 
expressed position that  ‘there is no ambiguity in the law and that the Republic of South Africa 
is under an obligation to arrest and surrender to the Court Omar Al Bashir ? and that  ‘there 
ĞǆŝƐƚƐŶŽŝŵƉĞĚŝŵĞŶƚĂƚƚŚĞŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂůůĞǀĞů ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐŚŝƐĂƌƌĞƐƚĂŶĚƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ?.102 Expressing 
disappointment with the process, South Africa argued that it interpreted it to be a  ‘diplomatic 
and political process ? that would take into account the kinds of  ‘hard diplomatic realities ? 
facing countries like South Africa.103  In its submission to the Court it stated that  ‘South Africa 
objects in the strongest possible terms to the manner in which its request for consultation in 
terms of Article 97 of the Statute was dealt with by the Court ?.104 The ANC government 
complained that what they thought would be a space for opening up a political conversation 
quickly  ‘morphed into a judicial process ?105 and stated that  ‘[i]n not affording South Africa an 
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽďĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ŝŶĂƉƌŽƉĞƌĨŽƌƵŵĂŶĚƚŽďĞƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇŚĞĂƌĚ ?^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ
fundamental right to justice was violated ?.106  
 
Whether or not South ĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ naïve in this respect, this bore political 
consequences. The ANC government conveyed its exasperation in its subsequent rationale 
for leaving the Court, citing ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ?Ɛ  ‘arrogant ? disregard for African prescriptions for 
transitional justice, arguing in its notification of withdrawal from the Rome Statute that it  ‘is 
of the view that to continue to be a State Party to the Rome Statute will compromise its efforts 
to promote peace and security on the African Continent ?.107 The ANC situated this critique 
within a broader concern about how the lack of responsiveness to African concerns 
contrasted sharply to the way in which it believed the Court allowed itself to be leveraged to 
serve the interests of major powers like the US.108  
 
 
102 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05- ? ?Ȁ ? ?ǡǯ
order further clarifying that the Republic of South African is under an obligation to immediately arrest and surrender Omar Al 
Bashir, 13 June 2015, available at {https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_06500.PDF} accessed on 20 May 2019, pp. 4-5. 
103 DIRCO, ǯubmission to the International Criminal Court (ICC) Regarding the Matter of President Al Bashir of Sudan. 
Press Release. Pretoria, (5 October 2015), available at: {http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2015/suda1005.htm} accessed 17 
September 2018). 
104 ǮSubmission from the Government of the Republic of South Africaǯǡp. 11. 
105 DIRCO (2015). 
106 ǮSubmission from the Government of the Republic of South Africaǯ, p. 16. 
107 UN, ǮNotification of South Africa of ǯ, p.3. 
108 ANC, ǮConcourt decision halts DA agenda to defend imperialismǯǡȋ15 November 2016), available at 
{https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/concourt-decision-halts-da-agenda-to-defend-imperi} accessed 10 April 2020. 
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/ŶƐŚŽƌƚ ?EŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨůĞǆŝďůĞďƌŝĐŽůĂŐĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĨƵůĨŝůůŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽƌĞŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞ
transitional justice norm privileges approaches that assemble combinations of transitional 
justice and peace building mechanisms it deems appropriate to the given situation. This does 
not foreclose the possibility of including the ICC and its prerogative of promoting criminal 
ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ/ ?ƐƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨĞůŝƚĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶƐŝƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚďǇƚŚĞE
to override African peacebuilding initiatives this generates tensions, and when in the case of 
the Bashir controversy it felt the ICC was closing down any space for political deliberation, 
this prompted the more dramatic threat to withdraw South Africa from the Rome Statute. 
 
Conclusion 
The first contribution this article has made is to highlight the importance of giving due care 
and attention to the actors, collectives and institutions that play critical roles in filling, shaping 
and contesting the content of international norms. This requires both an understanding of 
the norm entrepreneurs themselves  W including their own idiosyncratic journeys towards 
arriving at normative standpoints  W and a focus on the  ‘multiple forms and sources of agency, 
and different forms of power, resources, and capacities different actors and actants possess ? 
to shape norms ?.109 In particular, we identify how actors may engage in norm development 
by employing a potentially creative and offensive strategy of bricolage. This includes a flexible 
consideration of the problems each actor must confront, and the identification of values and 
behaviours that can be used to address them, drawing on a resource bank of existing 
practices, behavioural rules, and knowledges available within a given historical context to the 
agents involved. 
 
Second, as a product of this focus, we have developed a new approach to help us understand 
how complex norms like transitional justice have been continuously contested. What 
potentially gives these norms longevity is a broad core hypothesis which a range of actors can 
commit to without compromising their own epistemological commitments. As such, while the 
nucleus of a norm - its core hypothesis - might retain a degree of stability and recognisability, 
it can be surrounded by a range of alternative (and potentially competing) meanings-in-use. 
The bricolages of values and behaviours that make up some of these competing meanings in 
 
109 Abrahamsen (2017), p. 134. 
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use might well only represent transient artefacts, fit for the purpose of addressing a particular 
problem or cluster of problems. Nonetheless, they form the basis for future experiments and 
modifications. They might reproduce and potentially amplify the contestation of the norm, 
but they also potentially introduce a pluralism and dynamic malleability to ƚŚĞ ŶŽƌŵ ?Ɛ
meanings-in-use that can sustain the continued engagement of a range of actors claiming to 
share a commitment to its core hypothesis.  
Third, this understanding of norm development, we contend, allows us to understand the 
nuances of the contestation on transitional justice. While the structure of complex norms 
might create something of an unsatisfactory muddle to international agents like the ICC, we 
concur with the call for a  ‘pragmatic constructivist ? approach by Ralph110, as well as the 
argument of Widmaier and Glanville, that such ambiguity potentially broadens a toolkit of 
future intervention and  ‘may enhance flexibility in implementation, providing room to adjust 
to interpretive shifts and unexpected events and preventing adherence to formal rules from 
undermining the deeper values that underpin the norm. ?111 Attempts by the Court to insist 
that its retributive meaning-in-ƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞd:EŝƐƐǇŶŽŶǇŵŽƵƐĂŶĚŝŶĚŝƐƐŽůƵďůĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶŽƌŵ ?Ɛ
core hypothesis has ĚŽŶĞůŝƚƚůĞƚŽĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĂŐĞŶĚĂĂŶĚŚĂƐŐĞŶĞƌĂted a particularly 
vociferous backlash from some African actors.112 Therefore, while ^ŽƵƚŚ ĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛprecise 
prescriptions for transitional justice and peace building also bear significant flaws, what their 
method of bricolage in norm-filling might offer is a common ground upon which a range of 
actors can begin to debate the range of appropriate resources available to them, including 
what unique combinations of  ‘old ? and  ‘new ? materials can be used within a given context in 
the pursuit of transitional justice.  
 
Recently, there has been greater recognition of a need to take alternative voices into account, 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛthreat to withdraw from the Rome Statute. For example, 
at the annual Assembly of States Parties meeting in 2016, the representative of New Zealand 
explained that  ‘[t]his session is chance for us to engage in an open, honest and respectful 
dialogue about how to ensure that the Court works effectively ? and, moreover, the 
withdrawal of African States Parties  ‘underlines the critical importance of being much better 
 
110 Ralph (2018). 
111 Wesley W. Widmaier 
ǡǮǣǡǯǡǡ ? ?ǣ ?ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǤ ? ? ?Ǥ 
112 For a detailed account see Clark (2018). 
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at listening to, and engaging with, African states on issues of concern to them ?.113 Similar 
opinions were expressed by the United Kingdom, Australia, Norway, Canada, and Spain, 
amongst others.114 More recently, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC has invited amici curie 
submissions from states, international organisations, and academics on the question of the 
implementation of Article 27 of the Rome Statute and its relationship with Article 98, in the 
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨ:ŽƌĚĂŶ ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽĂƌƌĞƐƚĂů-ĂƐŚŝƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞ/ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞ ?115 
As Charles Jalloh has noted, this is  ‘[a] great strategic move on the part of the ICC appeals 
chamber. In effect, it is saying to the AU, we want to listen to you. Your immunity concerns 
matter to us ?.116 Additionally, Judge Song, the former President of the ICC, recently noted that 
the retributive justice on which the ICC is based will need to be expanded to include 
restorative and reparative justice.117  
 
Meanwhile, there are signs of a willingness to reopen constructive dialogue between South 
Africa and the ICC. 2019 saw the election of Cyril Ramaphosa to the South African presidency, 
who is widely believed to place greater value on the ICC than his predecessor, Jacob Zuma. 
Ramaphosa has ordered a review of South African foreign policy and opened new diplomatic 
channels to the Hague. At the 18th Assembly of States Parties meeting in the Hague in 2019, 
the South African representative expressed ŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛsupport for the work of the Court 
and the prosecution of international crimes but reference was also made to how its continued 
membership risked  ‘undermining its ability to carry out its peace-making mission efforts in 
Africa, and elsewhere ? and it was said  ‘we are still debating on the issue of withdrawal ?.118 At 
the same time, 2019 also witnessed a military coup in Sudan and its military leaders have 
expressed their desire to see former president Omar Al-Bashir tried by the ICC. While no 
panacea, his removal from office could remove a major point of contention between African 
 
113 Statement of New Zealand delivered by Mr. C. Reaich at the 15th Session of the Assembly State Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (17 November 2016), available at: {https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/GenDeba/ICC-
ASP15-GenDeba-NewZealand-ENG.pdf} accessed 13 September 2018. 
114 The statements are available at: {https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/sessions/general%20debate/Pages/GeneralDebate_15th_session.aspx} accessed on 13 September 2018. 
115 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Order inviting expressions of interest as amici 
curiae in judicial proceedings (pursuant to rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), 29 March 2018, available at:. 
{https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_01892.PDF} accessed on 30 May 2019. 
116 Charles Jalloh C, Twitter, 31 March 2018, available at: {https://twitter.com/CharlesJalloh/status/979870179495698434} 
accessed 13 September 2018. 
117 Diana Goff, Twitter, 21 May 2018, available at: {https://twitter.com/dianajanaegoff/status/998570425142702080} accessed 22 
May 2018. 
118 Statement of the Republic of south Africa by Mr J. Jeffery at the 18th Session of the Assembly State Parties to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (2 December 2019), available at: {https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP18/GD.SOU.2.12.pdf} accessed on 15 January 2020. 
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states and the ICC, not least because opposition to his trial based on arguments about the 
political costs of trying a head of state are now redundant. These political developments, both 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ / ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ĨƌŝĐĂ ? ŵŝŐŚƚ ŽĨĨĞƌ ĂŶ ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ƚŽ ĂƌƌĞƐƚ ƚŚĞ / ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
continent, while increased dialogue between key agents could breathe pluralism and vitality 
into broader debates about the future of transitional justice. 
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